John MacMurray is a Scottish philosopher (d. 1976) who deserves a wider hearing. His critique is brazen, nothing short of declaring the need to invert the fundamental assumption of modern philosophy. Following Descartes philosophy has built its house on the assumption of the 'self' as isolated thinker. In other words, what is the one ground of certainty that truth can stand on? Myself as a cognative being. The deadend along this road is Kant who, while positing the real existence of a world outside of humans, nonetheless concludes that this world is inaccessible to us. Reason is only helpful insofar as it follows concepts (rules) that in turn allow us to synthesize (schematize) experience according to unavoidably human categories. Transcendence is beyond us. The best we can do is - believing in the laws of non-contradition and moral law (faith alone!) - is hope our moral rectitude find reward if there is anything beyond us. Post-Kant, western philosophy dissolves. By the time MacMurray gives the Gifford lectures in the 1950's, philosophy is divorced between logical positivists (let's just clarify what we're saying) who maintain the philosophic method without ultimate concerns and existentialist who hold tight the concerns but without a method. What to do?
MacMurray's contention is that philosophy needs a new foundation, not the isolated thinker but the self as agent. This assertion presupposes that theory and practice cannot be unrelated. Humans are not fundamentally abstract thinkers, but persons with thoughts, intentions, emotions, and actions. Responding to the "crisis of the personal," MacMurray's goal is to replace the 'I think' with the 'I act' as the first principle of philosophy. Two things need to be said here. First, MacMurray's understanding of action is inclusive. What he means by this is, whereas action necessarily includes the rational faculties of a person, the same is not true of thought. He explains,
"The concept of 'action' is inclusive. As an ideal limit of personal being, it is the concept of an unlimited rational being, in which all the capacities of the Self are in full and unrestricted employment" (87).
While certainly no one achieves this limit in life, the construct is illuminating. Is this not the intent of so many New Testament passages that assert belief results in action? MacMurray's point is that knowledge is not abstract. The test of adequacy of any philosophy comes by applying theory to the world of action. Does theory clarify the telos of action? Does theory enable people to achieve that telos?
Second, MacMurray insists that "any philosophy which takes the 'I think' as its first principle, must remain formally a philosophy without a second person" (72). If you are an "I think" and I am an "I think", all either of us can do is "I think" about the other! Anyone married knows how far this is from personal knowledge of a spouse. Extending the point, however, Macmurray opines, "The idea of 'God' is the idea of a universal 'Thou' to which all particular persons stand in personal relation." Unfortunately, Kant did not have a category by which to schematize this!
There is plenty more to discuss in MacMurray. This book is only a prelude to a second volume that focuses the discussion of persons within the context of community. Perhaps the best way to conclude, however, is to ask what this means for theologians. Here are two brief suggestions:
1. If persons are agents (actors) and knowledge is not theoretical, theology should not be abstract. God is a trinity of persons and we are persons as well. Knowledge, therefore, must be inter-personal.
2. The divide of theory and practice is a modern contruct to be deconstructed. Practice is the fulfillment of theory and if in practice a theory doesn't work, it needs to be abandoned. This is precisely the wager of Christian faith. We believe that human fulfillment only comes by communion with God in Jesus Christ. If Christ does not have the power to change lives - not just minds - he is not worth following. This sounds blasphemous unless, that is, one really believes and has experienced the power of the resurrection.
Finally, let me end with a quotation worthy of resounding down the corridors of ever liberal religious studies department in the Western world:
"Is it not more likely that our capacity for scepticism is as unlimited as our credulity, and increases, like all our powers, with exercize"
Really good stuff. Hard words for the Reformed.
ReplyDeleteOne modern Christian(?) provocateur, when asked if his particular take on things meant that he denies the resurrection, replied:
ReplyDelete"Yes, every time I ignore the poor, I deny the resurrection.
Every time I turn a deaf ear to the oppressed, I deny the resurrection.
Every time I walk past on the other side, I deny the resurrection." etc.
In an unexpected way, he was bringing together theory and practice, and so convicted the audience who, too, deny the resurrection in their practice.
So I appreciate the call to deconstruct the divide of theory and practice. But isn't their room, even in the resurrection example, for practice to not measure up to confession? Can I confess something truly with my mouth that I then lie about in my body? The body's lie does not make a lie of the mouth's truth, does it?
Granted, this is less than ideal, but it is a real possibility, yes?
Jeremy